We study the growth effects of regional trade agreements (RTAs), taking into account the WTO participation of RTA members. We lay out a model of economic growth in which trade liberalization through the WTO or RTAs allows for easier access to intermediate goods produced by other members. The model predicts a stronger growth effect of RTAs for non-WTO members than that for WTO members. Based on a comprehensive set of 270 RTAs and a large panel dataset, the regression results show that RTAs promote growth for non-WTO members; while their growth effect is insignificantly different from zero for WTO members.
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"RTAs can foster economic growth and development. But such an outcome is dependent upon various factors, including net trade-creation, an improved regulatory environment, enhanced investment flows and technology transfers. … A key question is whether they are a building block to non-discrimination or a permanent feature of the trading landscape. Concern has been expressed that some RTAs reflect a defensive necessity aimed at maintaining access to larger markets, locking out competition from other MFN suppliers and locking in investment. If such trends are sustained and not counterbalanced by a successful outcome of the Doha Round, the contribution of an ever-growing number of overlapping RTAs to the economic progress of both parties and non-parties could be negative." (Italics added) -WTO, Developmental Aspects of the Doha Round of Negotiations (WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.2, June 27, 2006)
INTRODUCTION
It is nearly a consensus among economists that free trade is generally a good thing. Many countries, especially developing countries, regard trade as a means to raise income levels and living standards. formed RTAs with neighboring countries in hopes of faster economic growth. As a Rwandan government official said, "Integration is our lifeline. … The Rwandan market is small so all our strategies are closely aligned to becoming a driving force in the regional economic bloc" (Financial Times, 9/22/2009 ). However, others doubt the positive development effects of RTAs in the region. As a commissioner of the African Union said, "Regional integration has played only a marginal role in most of our development." 2 Although economic development is a main impetus behind regional integration, its effects remain to be seen. For example, Mexico failed to register fast economic growth after the NAFTA despite the boom in Mexico-U.S. trade.
Conversely, as late entrants to RTAs, East Asian countries have been growing faster than the rest of the world. Therefore, examining the growth effects of RTAs is of great relevance to the current debate on regionalism.
In this paper, we study the effect of trade agreements on economic growth. However,
given the large existing literature on economic growth and trade in general, what are the benefits of studying the growth effects of trade agreements in particular? First, most of the existing studies on trade and growth use trade volume (e.g., openness) or trade policy variables (e.g., tariffs), which are usually the results of various approaches to trade liberalization. Studies using these measures cannot disentangle the growth effects of one approach to trade liberalization from others, and are silent on the degree of their complementarity. 3 Second, there might be something peculiar about trade agreements that benefit their members beyond trade or render the beneficial effects of trade ineffective. Our analysis in this paper captures not only the effects of trade agreements on growth through trade, but also their effects through many non-trade channels.
Despite the importance, the growth effects of RTAs do not receive enough attention from researchers. As noticed earlier by Venables (1995, p1614) , "The potential growth effects of RIAs [regional integration agreements] often seem to be uppermost in the minds of policy makers, yet they have received relatively little attention in the academic literature." Since then, researchers have made some progress as reviewed in the next section. Existing papers typically use dummy variables for RTAs in cross country studies and mostly find insignificant growth effects of RTAs. We improve upon the exiting studies in several ways. First, considering the tremendous heterogeneity among RTAs (in terms of the number of partners covered, bloc size, and the degree of liberalization), we use a variety of measures of RTAs that are more precise than indicator variables. Second, most of the previous papers examine RTAs before the 1990s and usually cover only a small subset of them; while the proliferation of RTAs began in the 1990s. We use a more updated dataset covering a comprehensive set of 270 RTAs reported
and not reported to the WTO by 2007. Finally and importantly, previous papers study the growth effects of the WTO and RTAs separately; while our analysis focuses on their interaction effect on economic growth, in hopes of enlightening the regionalism versus multilateralism debate (i.e.,
whether RTAs are the stepping stones or stumbling blocks of multilateral liberalization). Despite the intense debate on regionalism versus multilateralism, "This area of research generally does not consider the effects of preferential trade agreements [on growth] as opposed to nondiscriminatory trade opening," as noted in the 2011 World Trade Report by the WTO when reviewing the literature on trade and growth (WTO 2011, p104) . In this paper, our objective is to fill this gap.
In a theoretical model, the enlargement of a country's free market size resulting from the formation of RTAs affects economic growth through reduced prices of imported intermediate In addition, we find that the above finding holds well for the full-fledged or "deep" RTAs signed under GATT Article XXIV, including free trade areas and customs unions, which we simply refer to as free trade agreements (FTAs). However, the corresponding estimated coefficeints are indistinguishably different from zero for the partial-scope or "shallow" preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed under the GATT Enabling Clause.
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This is to be expected because of their poor implementation and very limited sector coverage. As described in the same WTO document used for the openning quote, "It is generally accepted that a developmental rationale exists for allowing developing countries to engage in progressive asymmetric liberalization with selected partners. However, if transition periods are too long or too many products are excluded from coverage, potential gains from RTAs in terms of growth and development will be foregone."
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a review of the literature. In Section 3, we lay out a theoretical model and propose the empirically testable hypothesis. In Section 4, we discuss the empirical strategy and the data. Regression results are reported in Section 5. And we conclude in Section 6. and Rodriguez-Clare 1998; Staiger and Tabellini 1999; and Mitra 2002) . Tang and Wei (2009) show that the WTO, as a commitment device, increases its members' investment and economic growth significantly since the Uruguay Round. Related, trade agreements can also help countries with weak institutions to lock-in their reforms which may benefit their long-run economic growth. This is one of important incentives of many developing countries that seek RTAs with richer nations (e.g., Mexico and the NAFTA; Central and Eastern European countries and the EU). Third, RTAs that reduce macroeconomic instability and help policy coordination within the bloc can raise long-run growth rates. Cadot et al. (2009) provide evidence that RTAs reduce the volatility of trade policy. Economic cooperation in areas like public goods provision (i.e., research and training, information sharing, trade facilitation, large scale infrastructure, joint 6 The enlargement of market size upon integration can help technological spillover, generate "scale effects" in R&D activities, and avoid replication of R&D in different countries. For example, Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (1996) study theoretically the growth-creating effects of trade blocs through their effects on innovation and technological changes. Please refer to Grossman and Helpman (1997) , Ventura (2005) , and Segerstrom (2011) for an extensive treatment of the links between trade, technology and growth.
LITERATURE REVIEW
development of institutional rules, and policy harmonization) is especially beneficial to economic growth.
In the theoretical literature, however, it is not a general conclusion that trade and trade agreements are always growth-friendly. Whether trade is good for growth depends on several parameters such as technology diffusion, the source of technological progress, and a country's initial conditions. On RTAs in particular, poorly implemented RTAs waste resources; and highly distortive ones may harm economic development of some members and outsiders when trade and investment diversion dominates trade and investment creation. Even in an overall growthpromoting RTA, some members especially smaller ones and those on the periphery may be worse off when firms relocate to the "center" of a bloc.
There are a growing number of empirical papers studying the growth effects of RTAs. Brada and Mendez (1988) , considering six RTAs in a growth accounting framework, find that these RTAs have positive but very small effects on members' investment and income levels.
Based on growth regressions, De Melo et al. (1992) find insignificant growth effects for several RTAs. Henrekson et al. (1997) show that EC and EFTA membership has positive and significant effects on economic growth but this result is not robust to the inclusion of different control variables. Vamvakidis (1998) finds that none of the five RTAs during the 1970s and 1980s led to faster growth, probably because most of these agreements were among small, closed, and developing economies (except the EU). Studying the effects of EU membership on labor productivity growth, Vanhoudt (1999) does not find a positive association between them either.
With an even more pessimistic view on RTAs in promoting growth, Vamvakidis (1999) finds that economies grow faster after broad globalization but slower after forming RTAs and the same pattern holds for investment. All of these papers use dummy variables to measure RTAs.
Different from these papers, Badinger (2005) This model is built on the theory on growth and the political boundary of countries as in Alesina and Spolaore (1997) , Alesina et al. (2000) , and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005 (1) A where 0 < α < 1; x ij (t) denotes the amount of intermediate input j used in location i at time t (produced by either home or foreign countries); and A captures total factor productivity. We assume that each location in a country is endowed with one unit of labor (L = 1), which is immobile between locations with inelastic supply. Hence we can drop L from equation (1) and use to measure income per capita in terms of final product (also the income in dollar value because we normalize the price of the final product to one).
At each location i, the firm produces a specific input X i using the location-specific capital K i according to the following linear production function.
(2)
where K i (t) denotes the aggregate capital at location i at time t. Because we assume that the location-specific capital is immobile between locations with inelastic supply, equation (2) 8 We assume that WTO members apply MFN tariffs to the imports from all of the other members but not to nonmembers. Although some WTO members may extend their MFN tariffs to many non-members, the benefits may be limited and are usually subject to uncertainties and the discretion of MFN tariff granting nations. For example, the normal trading relationship granted by the U.S. to China was subject to legislative approval in the U.S. on a yearly basis from 1990 until the late 1990s.
The intermediate goods markets are assumed perfectly competitive. Hence each unit of input i will be sold at a price equal to its marginal product in both home (within FTAs) and foreign market (outside FTAs), when the price of final goods is normalized to one. The market price of input i at time t, , can be written as follows.
(3) 1
Based on equation (2), we have the following resource constraint for each input i in country :
where is the stock of capital in location i of country . For simplicity, we drop the time subscript t where there is no ambiguity. is the market size of the FTAs in which country is a member and is the unit of input i used in each location within the FTAs. is the size of countries that have WTO but no FTA relationships with , and , is the unit of input i shipped to each location in these countries. Equation (4) shows that the resources used to produce input i in country are allocated among the FTA partners of (Home, including itself), other WTO members (but not FTA partners), and non-WTO/FTA members (i.e.,
). If a country ( ) has no FTA, then the first term of the right side of (4) will be reduced to its own size ( ). If a country ( ) is not a WTO member, then the second term of the right side of (4) will be zero.
By substituting (3) into (4) we obtain the following two equations. (5) and (6) imply that barriers to trade (τ) increase the domestic use of an input and reduce international trade.
Then by substituting (5) into (3) we obtain:
On the consumption side, we assume that an individual at each location i has the following standard continuous time CRRA intertemporal utility function: (10) into (5) and (6), and using (1) (12) as (13) , ∉ * 1
Before we do comparative statics analysis on how the changes in , and affect economic growth, the following assumptions on the relationship between and are necessary.
Equation (14) implies that a country's entry into the WTO does not affect the size of its existing FTAs because we assume that MFN tariffs are higher than (at most equal to) the zero FTA internal tariffs. Equation (15) 
Comparative statics analysis with exogenous external tariffs of FTAs
For now, we assume that signing an FTA removes the internal trade barriers, but does not affect a country's external tariffs on imports from non-FTA partners. Equations (11)- (15) provide the following comparative statics results:
The above theoretical results offer several interesting predictions. Equations (16)- (17) show that the growth effects of and are larger when and are larger because these tariffs apply to more imports. Equation (18) states that the effect of WTO coverage ( ) on growth depends on , the degree to which WTO members liberalize trade vis-à-vis outsiders (or the "preference" margin of MFN tariffs). Equation (19) The above prediction is related to the extent-of-the-market theory, which shows that an increase in openness reduces the importance of domestic income in generating later growth. Ades and Glaeser (1999) and the papers by Alesina-Spolaore-Wacziarg cited previously argue that access to larger markets helps economic growth especially for small countries; and Alcal´a and Ciccone (2003) provide some empirical evidence. Instead of studying the growth effects of a country's domestic economic size and its interaction with openness, in this paper, we look at the growth effects of FTA size and its interaction with WTO membership.
Comparative statics analysis with endogenous external tariffs of FTAs
FTAs are so far assumed not to affect external tariffs on the imports from non-FTA members. A large literature on endogenous external tariffs suggests that the external tariffs may increase or decrease. Please refer to Freund and Ornelas (2010) among others for reviews of the related papers. We do not intend to incorporate endogenous external tariffs into the model.
Relying on theoretical predictions in the existing literature, we only discuss how the endogeneity of external tariffs may affect FTA growth effects. We therefore allow for both positive and negative effects of FTAs on external tariffs, not restricted to a specific mechanism. With endogenous external tariffs of FTAs, and will be affected by FTAs. For simplicity, we assume that the effects of FTAs on and are the same (i.e., ⁄ ). Based on equations (12) and (13), we have: (19) and (20), the above two formulas have an additional term related to the effects of FTAs on external tariffs or openness ( ). Whether the effects in (21) and (22) are bigger or smaller than those in equations (19) and (20) A couple of notes are in order here before we move to the empirical analysis. First, although our theoretical results are driven by market access to inputs, there are many channels through which trade and trade agreements may affect growth (e.g., technology, investment, scale economies, and increased varieties and competition). Empirically it is difficult to disentangle these effects from each other. Therefore, we should allow for a more general economic interpretation of our results reported later. Second, higher income levels achieved by countries participating in the WTO or FTAs through reduced trader barriers on inputs is a "level" effect, so what our empirical analysis captures is the economic growth when countries transit from a lower income level to a higher income level. Although this is not a genuine permanent effect on a country's steady state growth rate, this is not really a problem. As Temple (2003) warns, we
should not undervalue level effects and it is quite plausible that past and future developments rest entirely on level effects, some large, some small (Obvious Rule #5).
10 10 Temple (2003): "In the Solow model, growth can only be maintained by a sequence of level effects, as a constant stream of technical innovations feeds through into higher output. It should not worry us that long-run growth in research-driven models is similarly hard to sustain, or unresponsive to policy. These models will continue to yield level effects that should be central to policy analysis."
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
We test our theoretical predictions using canonical cross-country growth regressions, which can be derived from the Solow growth model (Solow 1956 ). In a panel data setting, this growth regression should contain some dynamics in lagged output and other controls as follows (see, e.g., Islam 1995).
(1) term. We could also use annual growth rate as the dependent variable, but this is equivalent to specification (1) because we have the lagged income variable on the right hand side.
Measures of trade agreements and empirical strategy
The WTO measure we use is a WTO membership dummy variable. In our empirical analysis, we also use these two measures to replace FTAtradesh.
Finally, we also include in our analysis a variable for the General System of Preferences (GSPexpsh), which is defined as the share of a country's exports to GSP granting countries among its total exports in a given year. We consider only exports because GSP does not affect directly the imports of GSP receiving countries. Because GSP usually has very limited product coverage, this measure, considering all of the exports to GSP granting countries, is a very rough one. Compared to FTAs and the WTO, GSP is special in that it is non-reciprocal.
Choosing other growth determinants
14 Product exclusion is less serious for full-fledged FTAs because GATT Article XXIV requires them to cover "substantially all the trade." Damuri (2009) shows that approximately 7% of tariff lines in the 15 RTAs between four major economies (U.S., EU, Japan, and Canada) are classified as "products excluded" either temporally or permanently, mostly in agriculture and food sectors. 15 Their estimates are based on all of the tariff-line level import and tariff data of the top 20 importers including EU27 and the other 19 largest importers, covering almost 90% of world imports in 2008. All of the exporting nations to the top 20 importers are covered. The trade coverage by exporters (as measured by their exports to the top-20 importers divided by their total exports to all of the countries) is also approximately 90%. We use the preference margin estimates for exporters because these estimates cover most of the countries in the world (223 exporters in total). 16 For exporters outside the WTO such as Russia, their "MFN" tariffs are regular tariffs vis-à-vis preferential tariffs.
The growth literature is flooded with a plethora of growth determinants. One challenge in empirical growth research is to identify the relevant regressors. Several approaches have been proposed to select growth variables (see, e.g., Levine and Renelt 1992; Sala-i-Martin 1997) .
More recently, model averaging techniques have become popular in variable selection as in Brock et al. (2003) and Doppelhofer et al. (2004) . Most studies suggest that initial or lagged income and the share of investment in GDP should be included, but they differ widely on other variables. Since there is no consensus on variable selection, our analysis follows the classic Solow model, augmented with trade related variables as the key variables of interest and many other variables for robustness checks.
The relationship between trade and growth has been studied extensively in the literature.
Authors use different measures of trade policy or trade outcome variables. These variables include but are not limited to trade openness (i.e., (export+import)/GDP), tariff, import penetration, years of open regime, and outward orientation or liberalization. In this paper, we use the openness measure as a control for overall level of trade liberalization because the data are readily available for a large number of countries over a long period. We also include the ratio of "nonproductive" government consumption over GDP (net of public spending on education and defense) as an explanatory variable. This ratio is used to capture the effects of the size of government on growth, highly relevant to the current debate regarding the role of government versus market in the economy. This ratio, widely used by researchers, is usually found to be negatively correlated with growth (see Barro 1991, among others) . 
Data and sources
The final dataset used in our regression analysis covers 177 countries over 1960 is a large panel dataset by country and year, although the RTA measures are constructed from a bilateral database in which an observation corresponds to two countries in a dyad. Online Appendix 2 has the definitions and descriptive statistics of most of the variables used in our 17 Human capital is an important growth determinant. However, several measures based on the schooling data from Barro and Lee (2010) and Cohen and Soto always have insignificant and often negative effects on growth. This is not uncommon in the growth literature as summarized by Durlauf et al. (2005; Appendix B) . In a study on RTAs, Vamvakidis (1999) also finds a highly insignificant and often negative effect of schooling on growth. This is likely due to the noisy data or significant delay of the contributions of education to growth. Therefore, we choose not to use schooling variables in our regressions.
growth regression analysis; online Appendix 6 lists the countries covered by our growth regressions (the bilateral data cover an even larger number of countries); and online Appendix 7
lists the 270 RTAs used in this paper and seven different data sources (available at:
http://ksuweb.kennesaw.edu/~xliu6/FTA_Growth_Appendices.pdf ).
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The import and export data used to construct our RTA trade share measures are from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Data on GDP per capita, openness, investment/GDP ratio, and government consumption/GDP ratio are from the Penn World Table 6 .3. Legal origin data are drawn from La Porta et al. (1999) .
Finally, the GSP data are mainly from the UNCTAD publication: Operation and Effects of the Generalized System of Preferences. We use all of the published reviews 1-10, which offer GSP data for years 1973, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979, and 1984 . In addition, we update the data to 2008 by using another source from the UNCTAD: Generalized System of Preferences List of
Beneficiaries [2001, 2005, 2006, and 2008] .
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All of the gaps are filled by extending the GSP data backward or forward.
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Some checks and changes are made to the original data according to specific government publications on GSP. The graduations or suspensions of some beneficiaries are also considered.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The dependent variable in our growth regression is the logarithm of real GDP per capita (i.e., log(rGDP/POP)). To alleviate the potential endogeneity problem, we lag all of the traderelated variables by one year so that they are predetermined in the growth regressions. To control for the unobserved heterogeneity across countries, we include country fixed effects in the regressions.
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A problem of the fixed effects is that they may throw away some useful between variations and inflate the problem of measurement errors. 
Baseline regression results
Although the focus of this paper is on the interaction between RTAs and the WTO, we show first the results from a specification without the interaction term. The first two columns of This pattern is consistent with our theoretical prediction and is further confirmed by the following regression analysis.
Columns (3) and (4) In columns (5) and (6), we include not only FTAtradesh for deep RTAs but also
PTAtradesh for shallow RTAs, as well as their interaction terms with the WTO_d variable. The coefficients for the first two variables are similar to those reported in the previous two columns;
while PTAtradesh and its interaction term are highly insignificant. This is to be expected because
PTAs have limited sector coverage and usually are poorly implemented.
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The extent-of-the-market theory discussed in section 3.2 predicts that increases in openness should reduce the importance of domestic market size in generating later growth. In the last two regressions of Table 1 , we add a country size measure and its interaction term with
WTO_d and remove the highly insignificant PTAtradesh related variables. We use the world share of a country's real GDP as a measure for its market size (rGDPsh).
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If the WTO helps to liberalize trade, then its effects on growth should be bigger for smaller countries. The OLS result reported in column (7) supports this view, but this result is not robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects as in column (8). The coefficients of FTAtradesh and FTAtradesh*WTO_d stay largely unchanged. 25 We should be cautious in interpreting the significant growth effect of FTAs for non-WTO members. If trade and investment diverting FTAs lower the growth rates of outside countries, then the positive growth effect of these FTAs can be partially a reflection of their negative growth effect on outsiders. Although the literature is not conclusive on trade diversion, it does not seem to be a major concern as summarized by Freund and Ornelas (2010) . 26 We have also tried adding WTO*GSP and RTA*GSP interactions. Because they are always highly insignificant, we choose not to include them in our regressions. 27 Previous papers testing the extent-of-market hypothesis usually use initial GDP or population size (POP) to measure market size in cross-sectional growth regressions. In our panel data regressions with country fixed effects, we cannot use initial GDP or POP. Current or lagged GDP and POP are not good choices either because of their potential correlations by construction with the dependent variable log(GDP/POP). Nevertheless, if we measure size in this way, its interaction with the WTO_d variable is insignificant in both the OLS and country fixed effects regressions; while the coefficient of FTAtradesh*WTO is still negative and significant at the 1% level.
Our results are consistent with the finding by Carpenter and Lendle (2011) This is also in line with the findings on the trade effects of the WTO.
Rose (2004) finds that WTO members do not trade significantly more than non-members; while Subramanian and Wei (2007) solve this "puzzle" by showing that the WTO promotes trade only for some countries in some sectors. For all of these reasons, we choose not to focus on the growth effect of the WTO in this paper. negatively correlated with growth as predicted by the income convergence hypothesis. Higher investment/GDP ratio promotes growth, while population growth and government consumption/GDP ratio are inversely related to growth.
Alternative measures of key variables and other robustness checks
So far, we rely on the interaction term between FTA and WTO variables to test our main theoretical prediction. Now we consider an alternative way to capture their interaction as discussed in Section 4.1. FTAtradesh_WTO and FTAtradesh_nWTO are the FTA trade shares between and not between WTO members respectively. Equations (19) and (20) imply
FTAtradesh_nWTO should have stronger growth effects than FTAtradesh_WTO. Panel I in Table   2 reports the results from regressions using these alternative measures, with and without country fixed effects. FTAtradesh_nWTO has a positive and significant growth effect at the 5% or 10% level; while FTAtradesh_WTO is always highly insignificant and actually bears a negative sign.
This supports our theoretical prediction and the previous results.
Second, we also use the more precise measures of preferential export share ( (7) drops OPEC countries. In all of these cases, the sign pattern of the FTA and its interaction terms stays the same as before and their coefficients are significant at the 5% or 10% level.
Fourth, our previous main finding holds even stronger in the regressions using the subperiod since the Uruguay Round . Appendix 3 (available online at:
http://ksuweb.kennesaw.edu/~xliu6/FTA_Growth_Appendices.pdf) shows that the estimated coefficients of FTAtradesh and FTAtradesh*WTO are even larger in absolute values and statistically more significant than the corresponding results in Table 1 . These results are 29 The null hypothesis that the first two coefficients in regressions (3) and (4) Endogeneity of trade is a long lasting problem in the trade-growth literature. In this paper, the same problem may exist for trade agreements. We address this issue with both economic and econometric arguments. Our results show that FTAtradesh is insignificant by itself in growth regressions (columns (1) and (2) Nevertheless, we address the endogeneity problem with formal econometric arguments.
To alleviate the endogeneity problem, we have lagged the FTA, WTO and their interaction variables so that they are predetermined in the growth regression. We have also tried including one-year and/or two-year lead variables of the FTA, WTO and their interaction variables to see if changes in FTA and WTO variables are correlated to the income levels in earlier years. None of the lead variables is significant (separately or jointly), suggesting no obvious reverse causality from growth to FTA and WTO membership. The results are not reported but available upon request. In the following, we further address endogeneity using standard two-stage least square (2SLS) and the generalized method of moments (GMM) method for dynamic panel data analysis.
2SLS is a standard method to address endogeneity problems, but its application is limited by the availability of valid instruments. For this reason, we only consider the endogeneity of FTA related variables, and take the WTO membership variable as exogenous given that WTO accessions are based on multilateral negotiations.
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The endogeneity of lagged income variable is not considered either in our 2SLS regression because convergence is not the focus of this paper.
The endogeneity of lagged income and WTO variables will be considered in the system GMM regressions. Valid instruments for FTAs should be correlated with FTAtradesh but not with economic growth. Time-invariant geographic variables, which have been used as instruments for trade in cross country growth regressions as in Frankel and Romer (1999) , are inappropriate choices in our panel data growth regressions with country fixed effects. We construct our instrument based on the contagion effects of FTA formation. Baldwin (1993) The left panel of Table 3 has the results from a 2SLS regression with country fixed effects and year dummies. The first stage regression results show that Contagion and Contagion*WTO are very strong instruments, both of which are highly significant with very high F-statistics. The second stage regression results provide even stronger support for our main hypothesis. The coefficients of the first two variables are more than doubled in absolute values as compared to those from regression (4) in Table 1 . The sum of the two coefficients is still insignificantly different from zero (p-value = 0.76). Therefore, our previous finding is robust to the consideration of the endogeneity of the FTA related variables.
Our panel data growth regressions include the lagged dependent variable as a covariate and contain unobserved panel-level effects. In a dynamic panel data setting, the correlation between the sample mean of lagged income and that of the error term can lead to inconsistency 32 Tang and Wei (2009) , using a Heckman procedure, do not find evidence of endogeneity of WTO accessions in a growth regression.
in within estimators. Arellano and Bond (1991) derived a consistent GMM estimator for this model, using lagged level variables as instruments for their first differences. This method has been used to estimate panel data growth regressions as in Caselli et al. (1996) . When explanatory variables are highly persistent (e.g., lagged income), lagged levels can be weak instruments for first differences, and the GMM estimator can be severely biased especially in short panels. To improve the precision and finite sample properties of the estimator, Blundell and Bond (1998) develop a system GMM estimator that uses additional moment conditions in which lagged differences are used as instruments for the level equation in addition to the moment conditions of lagged levels as instruments for the differenced equation. Bond et al. (2001) show that the system GMM estimator provides more reliable estimates when estimating growth regressions.
Hence, we will use this system estimator in our paper. This method cannot only help to correct the bias in the coefficient of the lagged income variable, but also allow for other endogenous explanatory variables. So it can be used to address the potential endogeneity of trade agreement variables. We consider the potential heterogeneity in the error term by providing the asymptotically heteroskedasticity-robust variance estimates.
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We also provide the test for serial correlation and the Sargan test for over-identification.
The right panel of Table 3 contains the system GMM estimation results. Regression (4) provides the baseline results, using all possible valid lags of lagged income as GMM type instruments, with all other covariates taken as exogenous. The FTA variable and its interaction with WTO_d bear the same signs as before and are highly significant, with much bigger coefficients in absolute values as compared to the results in Table 1 . This lends even stronger support to our theoretical prediction. Regression (5) 33 The system GMM can be estimated by a one-step or two-step procedure. When the errors are heteroskedastic, simulations suggest that the asymptotic standard errors for the two-step estimators can do poorly in hypothesis testing with typical sample sizes. In these cases, inference based on asymptotic standard errors for the one-step estimators appears to be more reliable (see Arellano and Bond 1991; and Blundell and Bond 1998) . Therefore, we adopt the one-step estimation. Windmeijer (2005) provides a finite sample correction for the standard errors estimated by two-step GMM, but this procedure produces unreliable results with extremely large standard errors (pvalues are one or nearly one for all variables except lagged income) for the GMM regressions reported in Table 3. exogenous. Regression (7) is the same as regression (6) except that it uses Contagion and Contagion*WTO as additional standard instruments. The results are again very similar to those in the previous columns.
The Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation (AC) in first-differenced errors shows that there is a first order serial correlation but no second order serial correlation for all of the GMM specifications in Table 3 . This supports the choice of using lagged values as instruments for the first differences. The Sargan test for over-identification does not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.
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Finally, it is useful to note that the coefficient of the lagged income variable from GMM regressions is very stable at 0.98 in Table 3 , somewhere between the OLS and within estimates reported in Table 1 (approximately 0.99 and 0.96 respectively). As noted by Bond (2002) , the true estimate indeed should lie in or near the range between the OLS estimate (upward biased) and within estimate (downward biased).
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This fact enhances the reliability of our GMM results, despite the strong assumptions underlying the method.
In sum, the GMM estimation results are broadly consistent with the previous findings, and provide even stronger support for our theoretical prediction.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Development and economic growth lay at the heart of the current WTO Doha Round negotiations. The rising regionalism has sparked concerns about its development effects, as shown by the opening quote from the WTO. This paper studies the growth effects of RTAs, taking into account the WTO participation of RTA members. We show that RTAs and the WTO do not appear to complement each other in economic growth. Although we do not have to to give up one or the other, this does raise some concerns about the currently motley spaghetti bowls within a multilateral system. If we still believe that the multilateral approach under the WTO is the first best, then countries should make some efforts to multilateralize regionalism, as 34 The distribution of the Sargan test is unknown when the disturbances are heteroskedastic, so the Sargan test is not available after specifying robust standard errors. For non-robust estimation, the Sargan test is heteroskedasticityconsistent only for the two-step GMM method. Hence, the Sargan test is based on the two-step procedure. Because our analysis covers a quite long time window , we have many GMM type of instruments when using all the valid lags of the income per capita variable as instruments and the p-value for the Sargan test is usually very high.
Restricting the GMM type instruments for income per capita variable to only recent lags can produce significantly smaller p-values without failing the test or overturning the main finding of this paper. 35 The within estimator is consistent only in fixed T and large N panels with all regressors being strictly exogenous.
recommended by Baldwin (2006) RTAs have the unique capacity to achieve faster and deeper liberalization at no further expense of multilateral rules, RTAs can be a good choice. Otherwise, we should be cautious when countries are forming more and more RTAs, especially PTAs.
As a final note, the regression analysis in this paper is an ex post analysis that seeks to explain the effects of RTAs in the past. The history of RTAs may be a poor guide for the future.
Although this paper finds that the contribution of RTAs to growth has been so far limited for WTO members, RTAs in the future may be guided into the right direction, for which we still need multilateral cooperation under the WTO. Notes: The dependent variable is log(rGDP/POP). "X_l1" refers to the lagged value of a variable X by one year. Year dummies are included in all of the regressions. "Other covariates" include the following time-invariant variables: region dummies, legal origin dummies, a dummy for least developed countries, and a dummy for OPEC countries. These variables are not shown on the table to save space. The test for b1+b2=0 [p-value] provides the p-values for the test of the H0 that the first two coefficients sum to zero. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: The dependent variable is log(rGDP/POP). "X_l1" refers to the lagged value of a variable X by one year. Year dummies are included in all of the regressions and country fixed effects are included in the 2SLS regression. The instrument (Contagion) for FTAtradesh in the 2SLS regression is defined as the average FTAtradesh of all of the trading partners of a country (after excluding this country's own FTA trade) weighted by 1/log(distance). Regression (4) uses all valid lags of the lagged income variable as GMM type instruments, with all other covariates taken as exogenous. Regression (5) takes FTA and WTO related variables as endogenous and uses their first two valid lags as GMM type instruments besides all valid lags of the lagged income variable used as instruments for the lagged income variable. Regression (6) is similar to regression (5) but only takes FTA related variables as endogenous. Regression (7) is the same as regression (6) except that it uses Contagion and Contagion*WTO as additional standard instruments for FTA related variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
